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C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 002139

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DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, AF/RSA  
NSC FOR COURVILLE AND SHORTLEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2016

TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PHUM](#) [PREL](#) [KPKO](#) [SU](#) [UN](#)

SUBJECT: VP TAHA SENDS MESSAGE: DARFUR SOLUTION SOUGHT BY  
SOME GNU OFFICIALS

REF: A. KHARTOUM 02104

[1](#)B. KHARTOUM 02112

Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume, Reason: Section 1. 4 (b) and (d).

[1](#)1. (C) At the behest of Vice President Ali Osman Taha, Minister of Cabinet Affairs Deng Alor told the CDA on September 5 that a rump cabinet-level working group is now working to devise a strategy for gaining support among all non-signatories for the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) by October 1. The goal is to pre-empt the deployment of United Nations peacekeeping forces and avoid a confrontation with the international community on UN Security Council Resolution 1706 by integrating non-signatories into the Government of National Unity (GNU). Alor delivered the message while describing a recent meeting with Taha, who had instructed him to show that elements within the government want a constructive way forward on Darfur.

[1](#)2. (C) Through Alor, Taha signaled that some GNU officials want to explore new options for a resolution to the crisis. Taha suggested to Alor that the UN could finance AMIS forces in order to strengthen their peacekeeping capability. He also proposed that the Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) created under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) could restore order in Darfur. Alor had reminded Taha that he had previously dismissed the JIU option during the Naivasha talks and, regardless, the units were not ready for deployment. (Comment: At this point, it would be difficult to induce non-signatories to join the DPA and the GNU without UN intervention, given the distrust of the Sudanese Armed Forces and AMIS within the SLM/A and the Darfurian population. End comment.)

[1](#)3. (C) Alor said that Taha asked for SPLM assistance in averting a collision with the international community over Darfur, and that the SPLM has GNU support for organizing a conference of SLM leaders (Ref A). The divisions in the GNU, however, are evident. Alor said that President Bashir exploded at the suggestion of including JEM leader Ibrahim Khalil in any SPLM-organized conference during a recent briefing by First Vice President Salva Kiir regarding his August 30 trip to Asmara. Alor also noted that SPLM Parliamentary Caucus Chair Yassir Arman told the working group on September 4 that the SPLM would support the NCP on Darfur only if it fully implemented the CPA, particularly on the lagging issues of North-South borders, Abyei, and oil revenues. Alor confirmed that opposition to UN forces emanates from President Bashir's office, as signaled by his antagonistic comments on UN intervention over the last two months (Ref B).

[1](#)4. (C) CDA Hume urged Alor to encourage his colleagues to

focus on the two most pressing issues in Darfur: the humanitarian situation and the practicalities of maintaining essential stability despite the announced AU withdrawal by September 30. He agreed to forward any working group proposals to Washington.

HUME